Director Network Influence on Stock Price Cash Risks

Director Network Influence on Stock Price Cash Risks Introduction A sprouting issue in corporate governance and the business world is the concept of executive network. Recent accounting and finance literature use social network theory to explain various corporate behaviors and practices steaming from information, resources exchange and relationship building. The correlation between executive network and earnings management (Omer et al, 2016; Chui, et al 2012), director network and tax management (Brown Drake, 2013), and director network and corporate investment decisions (Singh Schonlau, 2009), among other corporate practices have been capaciously researched but stock price crash risk has been overlooked in the area of social networks. Firms have congruent behavior patterns as a result of the information exchange among them. The observed herding behavior of firms can be explained by social network theory which predicts firms to imitate others especially those perceived to possess superior information (Lieberman Asaba, 2006). Corporate executives have incentives to manipulate the financial performance by withholding bad news (with the believe that such bad news can be over turned in the future) and accelerating the disclosure of good news (as this signifies competency). As directors imitate each other, such behavior can easily diffuse among them. The effect of director networks on firms performance disclosures is multifaced. Prior director network literature document that through information exchange, directors learn from their peers on how to better perform their monitoring and advising roles to maximize shareholder value (Chuluun et al., 2014; Larcker et al., 2013). Directors can enhance their monitoring expertis e by linking up with other directors who are more experienced and connected to other experienced directors. Through the positive learning hypothesis, directors become better monitors of managers of their firms. My conjecture here is that directors can improve their individual expertise and efficiency by obtaining more quality information from other directors. As a two-edged sword, director networks can also be a vehicle for the diffusion of bad corporate practices. Social interactions can act as dais through which information about undesirable corporate practices are exchanged. According to Davis (1991), the diffusion of poison pills adopted among US firms in the late 1980s were engineered through the network directors built. Also, options expending and backdating were documented to relate to networked firms (Reppenhagen 2010, Bizjak et al., 2009). The propensity to replicate bad act when those engaged in the act go scot-free after a long time (Marvin Shigeru, 2006). By the negative learning hypothesis, directors carry information about such bad corporate practices to their firms. This can mitigate against the monitory role of directors hence adversely affect their performance. I assume that directors take the final responsibility for various corporate practices including financial report transparency and disclosures. This proposed study seeks to employ social network and business imitation theory to examine stock price crash, which usually result from hoarding bad news from the stock market. Prior literature argue that managers hoard bad news either to achieve personal goals such as higher compensation, job security and empire building or presumptuously to maximize long-term shareholders value (Ball, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009; Graham et al, 2005). Whatever the goal, whether to achieve personal agenda or to promote shareholder value, bad news hoarded and accumulated for long result in stock price crash. (Hutton et al.,2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). Several papers, summarized below, have explored the connection between crash risk and various firm level characteristics. However, studies that directly investigate stock price risk through executive personal characteristics have concentrated mostly on managers personal attributes such as CEO over confidence but the social structure within which the phenomenon is practiced has largely been ignored. My proposed study seek to examine the empirical link between the relationships directors build and the distribution of stock returns. My study will contribute to the literature in several ways. First, to my knowledge, this will be the first study to examine the relation between director network and stock crash risk. By focusing on a unique perspective, this study will provide new evidence concerning the economic consequences of social imitations. In particular, the findings will identify significant benefits that social interactions bring to firms and their shareholders. Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) and Yan (2011) suggest that extreme outcomes in the equity market are of extreme concerns to shareholders and will require interpretations. Thus, the empirical evidence will be useful for understanding the role that director network plays in influencing both corporate behavior and investor welfare. Second, this will extend the literature on corporate governance by showing the relation between social connectivity and stock price crash risk relative to the strength of corporate governance mechanisms in place in a firm. Th is will provide more explanation on the conventional governance mechanisms in monitoring the flow of corporate information to the equity market. Third, this study will add to the research on bad news hoarding theory of stock price crash risk. In particular, the implication of social interactions for future crash risk will provide valuable insights into the behavioral-sociological nature of managerial manipulation of information. Recent studies on crash risk suggest that managerial bad news hoarding activities can be explain via religion (Jeffrey L. Callen and Xiaohua Fang, 2015), corporate social responsibility (Yongtae Kim, 2014), CEOs over confidence (Jeong-Bon Kim, 2014), CFOs equity incentives (Jeong-Bon Kim, 2011) accounting conservatism (Kim et al, 2010), tax avoidance (Kim et al, 2010), and corporate financial opacity (Hutton et al, 2009). However, it is not clear what role executive social connections and/or social norms play in influencing the behavior to conceal bad news. My study will help to fill this gap in the literature by providing evidence on the relation between director network and crash risk and the consequential role that social connections play on managerial bad news hoarding activities. Last, but not the least, this study will provide investors with priceless information on how the social business environment affects firm behavior, which may help them to predict and eschew future stock price crash in their portfolio investment decisions. Research objective The objective of this study is to find out how stock price crash is influence by the social set up directors build. Specific research questions are; Can stock price crash risk be explained through director network? Does the level of stock price crash risk increase with the degree of executive connectedness? How much dissidence of stock price crash is attributable to director network? Research design The variables for this study-director connectedness and stock price crash risk will be independently estimated using Riskmetrics, CRSP and COMPUSTAT data. The Riskmetrics will be used in computing the measures of directors network. Data on the stock return for the calculating crash risk will be obtained from CRSP while compustat will provide the relevant company financials for my research. My sample size will cover the period of 1990-2014. The result of the first stage estimation will be put into a cross-sectional regression model for further estimation of the relationship between firm networks and stock price crash risk. I will use UCINET/PAJEK to estimate various dimensions of director networks (Omer et al., 2014). Crash risk will be estimated using (Chen et al .2001), Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al (2009) models which provides three measures of crash risk including i) the negative coefficient of skewness of firms specific daily returns, ii) the down-to-up volatility of firm -specific daily returns, and iii) the difference between the number of days with negative extreme firm-specific daily returns and the number of days with positive extreme firm-specific daily returns. The primary model for the regression will be; CrashRiskj =ÃŽÂ ±+ÃŽÂ ²1 DirectorNetworkj + ÃŽÂ ²2Controlvariables + ÃŽÂ µi Where CrashRiskj and DirectorNetworkj refer to the various measurements of crash risks and director networks of firm J respectively. Literature review Former Chairman of the Board of General Motors John G. Smale wrote in 1995: The board is responsible for the successful perpetuation of the corporation. That responsibility cannot be relegated to management. A board of directors is expected to play a key role in corporate governance. The board has responsibility for: CEO selection and succession; providing feedback to management on the organizations strategy; compensating senior executives; monitoring financial health, performance and risk; and ensuring accountability of the organization to its investors and authorities. The board thus play important role in corporate governance hence the need to study the board in broader perspective including their social networks. This is because through network, knowledge, ideas and corporate practices whether good or bad are shared between companies. Director network thus serves vehicle for the spread of behavior between related firms. (Asch 1951; Milgram 1963, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003, 2009) Director networks Social network theory suggests that individuals behavior is the product of their social interactions and this connection extends to corporate behavior (Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010). Individuals and their links form a network across which they share ideas and resources, which influences their decision. Under opacity, observe behaviors of others, can provide useful insights (Marvin Shigeru, 2006). Social networks serve as channel for the transmission of information about corporate practices climaxing into herding behavior (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch, 1998; Hirshleifer Hong Teoh, 2003). The link can either be direct such as shared directorates, trade partnership or indirect such as friend of friend of friend. Newman (2010) provides evidence on the relevance on the indirect link in the information sharing process. A director with many connections become an information hub making him very powerful in the chain of network. This is described as centrality in the n etwork literature (Jackson, 2008). A direct link to an information hub increases access to more complete information. Also, connection to a direct link to the information hub can acquire some information, though the closer the better. This had led to four measurements of director network namely degree, eigenvector, betweenness and closeness centralities. Degree centrality is the absolute measure of individual social connections and boast of more information. The indirect connection where ideas exchange is from several other links is known as eigenvector centrality. Betweenness centrality relates to information control within the web. In a network, an individual positioned between two others serving as the medium of information exchange between them is viewed as one controlling information flow. The last dimension of network which relates to the proximity to information access to enhance optimization is the closeness centrality. Closeness centrality measures how quick information fr om other members of a network gets to an individual. The closer an individual is to a source of information, the more efficient and easier it is to access information (Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010). The kind of information received will be parallel to the actions of the individual. I therefore, hypothesize that, firms within the same network will have homogeneous behavior. Director networks and stock price crash risk Financial reports provide information about a firms economic performance. Accounting numbers are crucial for economic decisions of a firms stakeholders but their relevance can only be harness when provided at the right time. Corporate executives naturally exhibit some resistance in disclosing bad performances of their firms and this behavior catalyst to stock price crashes (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). Managers have been reported to have hoard information to opportunistically influence contractual outcomes (Cheng, Man, Yi, 2013, Healy Wahlen, 1999; Verrecchia, 1983). Extant literature documents the motives for information hoarding such as personal gain and career concern. (Kothari et al. 2009). In addition, Ball (2001, 2009) argues that nonfinancial motives, such as empire building and maintaining the esteem of ones peers, also provide powerful incentives for managers to conceal bad performance. Empirically, Kothari et al. (2009) find evidence consistent with the tendency of managers to hoard bad news. The managerial tendency to withhold bad news leads to bad news being stockpiled within the firm. However, there is a certain point at which it becomes too costly or impossible for managers to withhold the bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). When such a tipping point arrives, all the hitherto hidden bad news will come out at once, resulting in a large negative price adjustment, that is, a crash (Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006). Moreover, Bleck and Liu (2007) argue that the withholding of bad news prevents investors from discerning bad projects from good ones and, therefore, from liquidating bad projects promptly. Thus, bad projects are kept alive and the resulting negative cash flows eventually materialize, triggering asset price crashes. Employing country- and firm-level designs, respectively, Jin and Myers (2006) and Hutton et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence consistent with the above mecha nisms of stock price crashes. Several papers support the linkage of director network to various corporate behaviors such as expending stock option, (Reppenhagen 2010), private equity incentives (Stuart and Yim 2010) stock option backdating (Bizjak et al. 2009) and poison-pill adoption (Davis 1991). Others include director network and mutual fund performance (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Kuhnen, 2008), venture capital investments (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007), executive compensation (Barnea and Guedj, 2009), and firm governance (Fracassi and Tate, 2008; Hwang and Kim, 2008). They provide empirical evidence on the transfer of behavior between related firms. Building on the literature on social network and the literature on crash risk, I propose that director network can affect firm-level stock price crash risk. Since director network can pass good or bad business practices, it can mitigate or contribute to crash risk, however, the quantum ultimately is an empirical question. The empirical analysis will shed light on this important issue. References Ashbaugh, Hollis, Joachim Gassen, and Ryan Lafond, 2005, Does Stock Price Synchronicity Reflect Information or Noise? The International Evidence, mimeo Barnea, A., Guedj, I., 2009. Director networks. Unpublished working paper. University of Texas, Austin. Brown, J. L., Drake, K. D. (2013). Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review Chen, J., Hong, H., Stein, J., 2001. Forecasting crashes: Trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics Chiu, P.-C., Teoh, S. H., Tian, F. (2012). Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. The Accounting Review Hutton, A.P., Marcus, A.J., Tehranian, H., 2009. Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk. Journal of Financial Economics Kim, J.B., Li, Y., Zhang, L., 2011b. CFO vs. CEO: equity incentives and crashes. Journal of Financial Economics Kim, J.B., Zhang, L., 2013. Accounting conservatism and stock price crash risk: firmlevel evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, forthcoming Kim, J.B., Li, Y., Zhang, L., 2011a. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics Kim J-B, Li Y, Zhang L. 2011b. Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of Financial Economics Kothari SP, Shu S, Wysocki PD. 2009. Do Managers Withhold Bad News? Journal of Accounting Research Lieberman, M. B., Asaba, S. (2006). Why Do Firms Imitate Each Other? The Academy of Management Review Malmendier U, Tate G. 2005. CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. The Journal of Finance Newman, M. (2010). Networks: an introduction: Oxford University Press Omer, T. C., Shelley, M. K., Tice, F. M. (2014). Do director networks matter for financial reporting quality? Evidence from restatements. Singh, P. V., Schonlau, R. J. (2009). Board Networks and Merger Performance.

This paper will address language barriers in customer service

This paper will address language barriers in customer service. This has demanded business to acknowledge their existence by having to set up bilingual websites, employing bilingual representatives as well as hiring third party language lines. Identifying language barriers With the development of global communication, language issues have entered the area of seller/ customer relations, causing serious barriers on the way towards effective servicing customers with different language backgrounds. ‘The diversity of today's customers offers many challenges to the human resources professional in a multi-ethnic company or institution.' (Morris, 2002, p. 32) Language barriers in the workplace relate to the two different spheres of company's performance: one sphere is represented by communication between employees, while another sphere is represented by customer service employees and the need to communicate with foreign-speaking customers. Allison (1999) wrote, that oral communication with customers for whom English is not the native language, frequently becomes a serious barrier towards effective customer service provision. (p. 26) As long as language problems within the company are underestimated, it is difficult to predict stable progressive development of the company's performance. This challenge becomes even more serious when native languages and origins of the customer and the customer service employee differ dramatically (e.g. English-Chinese). In this situation creation of the bilingual websites to deliver the necessary information to the customers has become one of the best resolutions of the discussed issue. In order to perform efficiently, companies have to attract language specialists for the proper organizing the customer servicing of foreign-language customers. Similar issues can be identified within the framework of manager/ supervisor cooperation. The inability to deliver company's mission and customer service requirements to the worker, who speaks a different language, will make it difficult to incorporate this worker (her) into the company's organizational structure. As a consequence, the quality of service provided may decrease. (Weinstock, 2003, p. 99) Simultaneously, the proper utilization of foreign-language workers for communication with foreign customers will lead to higher quality of company’s customer service. Language issues in customer service are even more serious for the company's corporate image and company’s performance on the market. The quality level of customer service is frequently included into the list of factors, on the basis of which customers make their choice towards a specific product or company. Thus, inability to overcome language barriers with customers may serve against the company's striving to occupy stable market position. (Jacobs, 2004, p. 150) The causes of language barriers Many highly-skilled and valuable employees have difficulty with the pronunciation challenges that American English puts before them. Many sounds in our language do not exist in their native languages, resulting in pronunciations that are unintelligible to the average listener'. (Ferris & Frink, 2003, p. 228) Physical articulation of English sounds by foreign language speakers is not the only cause of language barriers in customer service. This list can be supplemented by the cultural problems closely connected with language, as well as the inability of the company's management to supply employees with effective solutions of language issues. (Ferris & Frink, 2003, p. 229) Recommendations Among the basic recommendations for the language problems' solution the following guidelines can be applied: – Â   Â  providing the customer service staff with opportunities to educate and broaden language skills; – Â   Â  utilizing foreign employees in the striving towards better customer service functioning, as well as including professional interpreters into the company's staff. (Varner & Beamer, 2005, p. 84) It is also essential, that company and product information is provided in several different languages to attract and retain customers with various origins and language backgrounds. Including multilingual approaches into numerous aspects of the company’s activity will only work for the benefit of the company’s customers, and as a result, for the benefit of the company’s performance. Conclusion Language barriers in the customer service may seem irrelevant in the light of other global problems, which companies have to solve daily. However, such language problems are much broader than it is traditionally assumed – improper customer servicing is a direct way towards worsening company’s image and decreasing company’s revenues. This is why in order to avoid far-reaching negative consequences language barriers should be timely and properly addressed. References Allison, M. (1999). Organizational barriers to diversity in the workplace. Journal of Leisure Research, 31, 26-32. Ferris, G. & Frink, D. (2003). Diversity in the workplace: The human resources management challenges. Human Resource Planning, 16, 214-242. Jacobs, E. (2004). Overcoming language barriers: Costs and benefits of interpreter services. Human Resource Planning, 17 (5), 149-151. Morris, C. (2002). Cultural and language barriers in the workplace. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Workforce Development. Varner, I. & Beamer, L. (2005). Intercultural communication in global workplace. Boston: Irwin/ McGraw-Hill. Weinstock, B. (2003). Bringing language and culture gaps in the workplace. Washington: Washington Business Group on Health.

In the Novel Frankenstein, by Mary Shelley, Victor...

In the novel Frankenstein, by Mary Shelley, Victor Frankenstein is the true monster, not the creature himself. Victor Frankenstein grew up in Geneva. He had a strong interest in reading the works of the ancient and outdated alchemists, and was fascinated by science and the secret of life. One day he decided that he wanted to study further, so Victor actually created a person of his own out of old body parts and strange chemicals. When the creature came to life, he was a hideously ugly beast. The creature does have beauteous features such as lustrous black hair, and teeth of pearly whiteness, but they do not look good because they are out of place in relation to his other features, such as his shriveled complexion, and watery†¦show more content†¦Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned from me in disgust (Shelley 115). The creature was truly miserable and hated the fact that he was even alive. All he wanted was someone to accept him and like him for who he was. Victor was once again acting in a monstrous manner when he refused to make a friend for the creature. The fact that the creature was always shut out from society and abandoned by anyone he ever came in contact with shows that perhaps if he had a companion, he would not have been acting out in so many rages, which results in no longer having to seek revenge. There would be no revenge to seek because he would be happy and satisfied with his life. Perhaps Victor had not realized that Â…the power to create may produce consequences that cannot be foreseen or controlled (Smolensky 1756). Before Frankenstein created his creature, he had not intended it to be a threat to his friends and family. He had also not realized that evil creates evil (Mellor Mary Shelley 363). In this novel, Victor did not only act in monstrous way toward his creature, but toward his loved ones as well. 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Evaluating investment Options - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 5 Words: 1372 Downloads: 9 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Economics Essay Type Argumentative essay Did you like this example? Evaluating investment options may be a challenging task for any investment plans by investors. Having options however, is a good start as it gives more choices in selecting the best investment approach that one is comfortable with. One main factor that many investors consider is the best alternative that successfully meets their savings targets. In line with choosing the best investment options, it is paramount to understand and consider all the investment styles, and the amount of risk that one is comfortable taking. There are three general investment styles that include the ten commandments, conservative, and aggressive. In the need to understand these investment plans, this paper is aimed at evaluating the basic guidelines that are relevant for aggressive equity investors and conservative equity investors for the purpose of decision making. To begin with, aggressive equality investors actively play the game of equality in a vigorous way. Most of the time is spent in managing their portfolio than their consecutive counterparts. They are subjected to high risks; the calculations are in albeit manner aimed at earning big return rates (Chandra, 2009). For the aggressive equality investors, the following general guidelines are relevant in their investment plans for appropriate decision making. The first guideline is to focus on investments that one understands to play their own game. According to Prasanna Chandra (2009, p. 670), â€Å"an investor should always know about the specific company they are investing in, more than the current market does in order to successfully manage their investments.† Therefore, an investor must clearly make a decision on what to focus on. Therefore, decision making is the main key to successful investments. The choices of making decisions are diverse. They include deciding to concentrate on growth, value, multinational companies, small companies, public sector companies, high grade bonds, or low gra de bonds. In choosing any of these strategies an investor should be mindful of the basic rules. These rules include being thorough, tough minded, being flexible in knowing the deal about any company one is buying into, and buying when the company is not understood by the existing market is a fundamental idea to keep in mind (Chandra, 2009). As argued by Candara, one should play the game that one is best in, advocating that an investor should do things as an analyst who is best in doing something. For instance, if an investor can foretell the most important development in the technology, in the economy, or in consumer preferences, and can best gauge its consequences on various equity values, then they should concentrate on doing that. However, one has to prove that they are honest with themselves without a bluffing self examination and testing of their performance. Another best guideline is to scout for special situations in the secondary market. It is important to note that, i nvestment opportunities that exist in the secondary market are very profitable. Unfortunately, these markets are not easy to identify. An investor has to be on alert and discerning. They mostly occur in situations such as turnaround situations which occurs when a company has been steeped in a poor performance for years and begins to recover; when an investment analyst says, it takes almost six months for a turnaround to present its high performance to the current market; amalgamations which refers to a combination of many companies forming a single company; and takeovers which involves acquisition of some given block of equality capital of a given company. Paying heed to growth shares is also a relevant guideline to aggressive equality investors. It is believed that, investments will always do well if the investors focus on the growth stocks. This is based on three basic guidelines, including developing sound standards for growth stock selection, investing in the growth stocks wi thout minding about the price, holding growth stocks in as much as they remain that way. In identifying growth stocks, an investor should select products and services which have a significant potentiality to increase the sales; good relationships of labor; effective cost controls and competitive strengths (Chandra, 2009). Another important guideline is to anticipate for the earnings ahead of the markets. This is because expected earning of the future is the most important factor that affects the prices of stocks. If the earnings per share increases, it means that the price for a share will rise; same way if the market is preparing for the falling of earnings per share, the price per share will therefore reduce. Leverage your portfolio when you are bullish is a relevant guideline for aggressive investors. Sometimes an investor may feel bullish about certain shares, but they lack enough funds to acquire them. In that case, an investor may obtain loans or overdrafts using their s ecurities. By doing so, they are leveraging their portfolio. For consecutive equality investor, investors usually seek to minimize the risk of investing as well as reduce the time and effort for managing portfolio. The main aim of consecutive equality investors is to seek some peace of mind and avoid aggressive investments. They are usually satisfied with any reasonable return as they do not struggle for more spectacular gains (Chandra, 2009). The general guidelines for consecutive equality investors include, avoiding certain kinds of shares, applying stiff screening criteria, looking for relatively safe opportunities in the primary market, participating in the schemes of mutual fund, and joining a suitable portfolio management scheme Joining a suitable portfolio management scheme is an important relevant guideline for consecutive equality investors. While mutual funds are highly attracted to smaller investors, management of portfolio schemes that is given by banks and othe r financial companies may be greatly attracted to larger investors. There are two types of schemes for this guideline, discretionary schemes whereby the client places money with the portfolio manager, the manager invests these funds according to his discretion and takes care of the paper work. The profits and losses are for the investor as the portfolio manager receives a service fee. The other scheme is non-discretionary scheme whereby, the investor places funds with the manager, who then offers counsel to that particular investor. The investor then gives his decision as the portfolio manager implements the decision and takes care of the paper work. The portfolio manager is then paid the service fee (Viceira, 2001). In avoiding certain kinds of shares, it is paramount to understand that, some shares are not suitable for consecutive investors. They include, shares of unlisted companies whereby, there is no organized market for these shares and so the market for assessing them is unreliable; manipulated shares, which are shares manipulated for certain business groups for their companies that boost share prices; and cornered shares which are operated by stock markets (Chandra, 2001) . Another guideline is applying stiff screening criteria. The consecutive investors should always choose shares that satisfy stiff requirements in the secondary markets. The criteria for screening that is recommended includes the size, that is, making sure the company is not small; competitive position whereby, the company should have a strong position in competition; industrial prospects, whereby the company’s prospects must be above average; price-earnings ratio, meaning the company’s price earnings must be very high and reputation of management, where an investor ascertains that, the management of the company must have a competitive reputation, commitment and integrity (Viceira, 2001). Looking for relatively safe opportunities in the primary market is yet an other guideline for consecutive investors. This means that, consecutive investors should be reluctant in buying shares that are in the secondary market. This is because they are bothered by the volatility and consumption of time in locating good bargains. Therefore, they turn their attention mainly to the primary markets (Chandra, 2001). From all the discussed guidelines, it is clear that, aggressive investors actively play the game of equity vigorously. Besides the general investment guidelines, aggressive equality investors should understand the guidelines specially relevant for them. The consecutive equity investors on the other hand try to minimize the risk of investments and consuming of time struggling to find the best bargains in the market. Besides the general investment guideline, consecutive equality investors should also understand the guidelines that are specially relevant for them, for better decision making. Therefore the choice of choosing to be an aggressive inves tor or a consecutive investor depends on the decision of the investor. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Evaluating investment Options" essay for you Create order